Salem Press

Great Events from History: The 19th Century
March 31, 1854: Perry Opens Japan Trade

An isolationist nation begins to emerge as a significant trading partner.

Locale: Edo Bay (now Tokyo Bay), Japan
Categories: Diplomacy and international relations; trade and commerce

Key Figures
Millard Fillmore (1800-1874), thirteenth president of the United States,
1850-1853
K{omacr}mei (1821-1867), emperor of Japan, 1846-1867
Hotta Masayoshi (1810-1864), senior councillor to K{omacr}mei
Tokugawa Nariaki (1800-1860), lord of Mito, Japan
Matthew C. Perry (1794-1858), commander of the U.S. expedition to Japan

Summary of Event
The mission of Commodore Matthew C. Perry to Japan from 1852 to 1854 was dramatic evidence of the United States' increasing interest in eastern Asia. It followed a series of overtures by other Western countries and coincided with a period of significant debate within Japan's ruling class over the prospect of opening the country to outside, particularly Western, influences.

From 1620 until Commodore Perry's squadron sailed into Edo Bay (later called Tokyo Bay), Japan had practiced a policy of rigid isolation and the exclusion of foreigners. In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Japan's experiences with Western missionaries and traders had been so negative that almost all contact with the outside world was broken off. Only the Dutch, Chinese, and Koreans were allowed to trade through one small port. In the nineteenth century, the desire to develop commercial relations, to exploit Japan's proximity to China, and to satisfy curiosity about Japan caused repeated attempts to open relations with Japan.

Prior to Perry's expedition, several European countries attempted to develop relations with Japan. Between 1771 and 1804, Russian individuals and government representatives made four separate, unsuccessful attempts to open Japan to trade. Japan redoubled its commitment to defend its northern islands against possible Russian advances, and no further interaction took place until Russia again exerted pressure in 1847. England was rebuffed in its 1818 effort to convince Japan to open trade. Following China's defeat in the Opium Wars, Japan was even further resolved to resist foreign influence.

Perry's mission was at least the fourth U.S. effort to open relations with Japan. In 1832, President Andrew Jackson had sent an envoy, Edmund Roberts, to negotiate treaties in East Asia. He concluded treaties with Siam (later known as Thailand) and with the Sultan of Muscat (later part of Oman) but died en route to Japan in 1836. In 1837, the merchant ship USS Morrison attempted to land in Japan but was repelled by cannon fire. In 1846, Commodore James Biddle arrived in Japan with the same goal that Edmund Roberts had been unable to achieve, but the Japanese refused to negotiate.

By 1850, the U.S. government was being pressed to open Japan. There was a clamor for the negotiation of a convention to protect U.S. sailors shipwrecked in Japanese waters, and the growing use of steam-powered merchant ships led to the demand for coaling stations. There also was a great desire for new markets in the Far East. In 1852, Millard Fillmore, thirteenth president of the United States, sent another expedition in an attempt to break down Japan's seclusion. He chose Perry as its commander and minister plenipotentiary and gave him broad powers. Perry was assigned five steam warships and four sailing vessels; his instructions were to arrange for commercial relations and to negotiate a treaty.

Perry's expedition left Hampton Roads, Virginia, in November, 1852. Gifts were carried to demonstrate the United States' technological prowess, including a telegraph set and a miniature steam locomotive with cars and track. Eight months later, in 1853, Perry led four ships into Edo Bay. The Japanese, who had never seen steamships before, were greatly impressed. Perry was determined to avoid the mistakes of other Western envoys. Under strict orders to use force only if absolutely necessary, he assumed a confident bearing and insisted on dealing only with the highest officials. At first, representatives of the bafuku, or military government, demanded that the ships proceed to Nagasaki, the only port at which Westerners were permitted to have contacts with the Japanese government. Perry refused to be intimidated or to leave Edo Bay until he was assured that the dispatches he carried, including a letter from the president of the United States to the emperor of Japan, would be delivered in the appropriate quarters. When the Japanese finally promised that the emperor would receive the U.S. treaty proposals, Perry steamed away, but not before he informed the emperor's agents that he intended to return in the spring of 1854 with a larger force and with the expectation of a favorable response.

The bafuku solicited advice from members of the Japanese ruling class on how to respond to Perry's demands. Seven hundred proposals were submitted, with none offering an ideal solution. A group led by the lord of Mito, Tokugawa Nariaki, advocated resistance to invasion at all costs. The Rangakusha, or "masters of Dutch learning" school, which had learned something of the West through Japan's limited connections to the Netherlands, argued that Japan's substantial military capabilities would be no match for Western armies backed by modern industrial technologies. They also believed that Japan would benefit more than it would lose from more exposure to Western ideas and technologies.

While Emperor K{omacr}mei and his advisers debated what response Japan should make to U.S. overtures, Perry returned to his exploration of the Far East. Believing that the glittering prospects for U.S. trade in the Far East required that the United States gain territorial footholds in the area, he took possession of certain of the Boning Islands, established a coaling station on Okinawa, and cast covetous eyes on Formosa; however, his superiors in Washington repudiated these actions.

In February, 1854, Perry returned to Japan with an impressive squadron of eight warships. The Japanese leaders had decided to deal with the North Americans as the least threatening of the Western powers. Japan was ready to accept, at least in part, the proposals of the United States. Perry exploited his advantage by demanding a treaty similar to the liberal agreement that the United States had negotiated with China in 1844, but the final terms, concluded in the Treaty of Kanagawa, signed on March 31, 1854, were less inclusive. The United States was to be permitted to establish a consulate at Shimoda, a small port on Honshu near Edo Bay, but there was no provision allowing U.S. citizens to take up permanent residence, and U.S. citizens and merchant vessels were allowed to enter only two small ports, Shimoda and Hakodate. Japan bound itself to assist shipwrecked U.S. sailors and return them and their belongings to the proper authorities. The agreement did not provide for the establishment of coaling facilities or for extraterritorial rights for U.S. citizens, but it did contain an article ensuring that the United States would be offered any future concessions that might be offered to other powers.

Significance
The immediate and practical effects of the treaty negotiated by Perry were minimal, and even they were not supported fully by Emperor K{omacr}mei and his advisers. The treaty prepared the way, however, for a broader commercial treaty that was signed by the emperor's senior councillor, Hotta Masayoshi, in 1858. Japan soon reached similar agreements with England, France, Russia, and the Netherlands.

Theodore A. Wilson, updated by James Hayes-Bohanan

Further Reading
Fallows, James. "When East Met West: Perry's Mission Accomplished." Smithsonian 25, no. 4 (July, 1994): 20-33. Discusses the event as an encounter between Commodore Perry and Masahiro Abe. Gives a history of previous missionary and other contacts in Japan.

Hane, Mikiso. "The Fall of the Tokugawa Bakufu." In Modern Japan: A Historical Survey. 2d ed. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992. Thorough, readable account of the political debates in Japan over how to respond to Western demands to open trade.

McDougall, Walter A. "Edo 1853." In Let the Sea Make a Noise: A History of the North Pacific from Magellan to MacArthur. New York: Basic Books, 1993. Describes Perry's expedition in the context of the overall maritime strategy of the United States.

Morison, Samuel Eliot. "Old Bruin": Commodore Matthew C. Perry, 1794-1858. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967. Chapters 20 through 28 of this biography detail contacts with Japan from Perry's perspective.

Morton, W. Scott. "The Winds of Change: The Tokugawa Shogunate: Part II, 1716-1867." In Japan: Its History and Culture. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1984. Puts Japan's response to Commodore Perry in a broad social context of Japan's struggle over relations with the Western world.

Preble, George Henry. The Opening of Japan: A Diary of Discovery in the Far East, 1853-1856. Edited by Boleslaw Szczesniak. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1962. The diary of Rear Admiral Preble, who served on the USS Macedonian as it accompanied Perry's expeditions to Japan, provides detailed observations of the expeditions.

Schroeder, John H. Matthew Calbraith Perry: Antebellum Sailor and Diplomat. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001. An assessment of Perry's long military career, including his efforts to modernize the U.S. Navy.

Wiley, Peter Booth, with Korogi Ichiro. Yankees in the Land of the Gods: Commodore Perry and the Opening of Japan. New York: Viking, 1990. Description of Commodore Perry's encounter with the Japanese draws on both U.S. and Japanese sources. Maps and illustrations.

See Also
Apr. 5, 1868: Signing of Japan's Charter Oath.

Related articles in Great Lives from History: The Nineteenth Century, 1801-1900: Stephen Decatur; David G. Farragut; Hiroshige; Ii Naosuke; Itô Hirobumi; Andrew Jackson; Oliver Hazard Perry; Saig{omacr} Takamori. Millard Fillmore; Mutsuhito; Ii Naosuke; Matthew C. Perry; Oliver Hazard Perry; Saig{omacr} Takamori.