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Encyclopedia of Genetics, Rev. Ed. Biological Weapons Fields of study: Genetic engineering and biotechnology; Human genetics Significance: Just as twentieth century discoveries in chemistry and physics led to such devastating weapons as poison gases and nuclear bombs, so humanity in the twenty-first century faces the prospect that the biotechnological revolution will lead to terrifying biological weapons. Key Terms ANTHRAX: an acute bacterial disease that affects animals and humans and that is especially deadly in its pulmonary form BIOLOGICAL WEAPON (BW): the military or terrorist use of such organisms as bacteria and viruses to cause disease and death in people, animals, or plants BIOTERRORIST: an individual or group that coercively threatens or uses biological weapons, often for ideological reasons ETHNIC WEAPONS: genetic weapons that target certain racial groups GENETIC ENGINEERING: the use of recombinant DNA to alter the genetic material in an organism IMMUNE SYSTEM: the biological defense mechanism that protects the body from disease-causing microorganisms RECOMBINANT DNA: DNA prepared by transplanting and splicing genes form one species into the cells of another species SMALLPOX: an acute, highly infectious, often fatal disease characterized by fever followed by the eruption of pustules Early History Biological warfare antedates by several centuries the discovery of the gene. Just as the history of genetics did not begin with Gregor Mendel, whose pea-plant experiments eventually helped found modern genetics, so, too, the history of biological warfare had a long history before the Japanese dropped germ-filled bombs on several Chinese cities during World War II. For example, the Assyrians, six centuries before the common era, knew enough about rye ergot, a fungus disease, to poison their enemies' wells. The ancient Greeks also used disease as a military weapon, and the Romans catapulted diseased animals into enemy camps. A famous medieval use of biological weapons occurred during the Tatar siege of Kaffa, a fortified Black Sea port, then held by Christian Genoans. When Tatars started dying of the bubonic plague, the survivors catapulted cadavers into the walled city. Many Genoans consequently died of the plague, and the remnant who sailed back to Italy contributed to the spread of the Black Death into Europe. Once smallpox was recognized as a highly contagious disease, military men made use of it in war. For example, the conquistador Francisco Pizarro presented South American natives with smallpox-contaminated clothing, and, in an early case of ethnic cleansing, the British and Americans used deliberately induced smallpox epidemics to eliminate native tribes from desirable land. As scientists in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries learned more about the nature and modes of reproduction of such diseases as anthrax and smallpox, germ warfare began to become part of such discussions as the First International Peace Conference in The Hague (1899). The worldwide revulsion against the chemical weapons used in World War I, along with a concern that biological weapons would be more horrendous, led to the Geneva Protocol (1925), which prohibited the first use of germ weapons, but not their development. From Germ Warfare to Genetic Weapons With the accelerating knowledge about the genetics of various disease-causing microorganisms, several countries became concerned with the threat to their security posed by the weaponizing of these pathogens. Although several states signed the Geneva Protocol in the late 1920's, others signed only after assurances of their right to retaliate. The United States, which did not ratify the treaty until 1975, did extensive research on germ weapons during the 1950's and 1960's. American scientists were able to make dry infectious agents that could be packed into shells and bombs, and estimates were made that ten airplanes with such bombs could kill or seriously disable tens of millions of people. Unknown to Congress and the American people, tests using apparently harmless microbes were performed on such large communities as San Francisco. When news of these secret tests was made public, many questioned their morality. Extensive criticism of the research and development of these weapons, together with the realization that these weapons posed a threat to the attackers as well as the attacked, led President Richard Nixon to end the American biological weapons program formally in 1969. Abhorrence of biological weapons extended to the world community, and in 1972 the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), which was eventually signed by most members of the United Nations, concretized this worldwide concern. However, the nations that signed the pact failed to reach agreement on an inspection system that would control the proliferation of these weapons. A pivotal irony of the BTWC is that while most of the world was renouncing germ warfare, biologists were learning how to manipulate DNA, the information-containing molecule, in powerful new ways. This knowledge made possible the creation of "superbugs," infectious agents for which there are no cures. Some scientists warned the public and international agencies about these new germ weapons. Other investigators discovered that American researchers were creating infectious agents that would confuse diagnosticians and defeat vaccines. Similarly, Soviet researchers on an Aral Sea island, described as the world's largest BW test site, were producing germ weapons that could be loaded on missiles. When Boris Yeltsin became president of Russia, he discovered that the secret police and military officials had misinformed him about BW programs, in which deadly accidents had occurred. Also troubling was the spread of biological agents to such countries as Iraq. American and French companies legally shipped anthrax and botulinum bacteria to Iraq, whose scientists later acknowledged that they had used these microbes to make tons of biological weapons during the 1980's. With the demise of the Soviet Union and increasing violence in the Balkans and Middle East, politicians became fearful that experts who had dedicated their careers to making biological weapons would now sell their knowledge to rogue nations or terrorist groups. Indeed, deadly pathogens were part of world trade, since the line separating legitimate and illegitimate research, defensive and offensive BWs, was fuzzy. In the 1980's members of a religious cult spread salmonella, a disease-causing bacterium, in an Oregon town, causing more than seven hundred people to become very ill. The same company that sold salmonella to this religious cult also sold pathogens to the University of Baghdad. Bioterrorism had become both a reality and a threat. Robert J. Paradowski See AlsoAnthrax; Bioethics; Biopesticides; Biopharmaceuticals; Emerging Diseases; Eugenics; Eugenics: Nazi Germany; Genetic Engineering: Risks; Genetic Engineering: Social and Ethical Issues; Smallpox. Further Reading Alibeck, Ken, with Stephen Handelman. Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World, Told from the Inside by the Man Who Ran It. New York: Random House, 1999. Alibeck was a Kazakh physician who helped create the Soviet Union's advanced biological warfare program. For some, this autobiographical account is the best and most comprehensive overview of the BW controversy; for others, Alibeck's treatment is tarnished by his long association with the Soviet system. British Medical Association. Biotechnology, Weapons, and Humanity. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Harwood Academic, 1999. Concerned that genetic engineering and biotechnology will be used to produce germ weapons, the physicians of the British Medical Association produced this helpful guide to facilitate public debate. Contains a glossary of technical terms and an excellent set of references. Cole, Leonard A. The Eleventh Plague: The Politics of Biological and Chemical Warfare. New York: W. H. Freeman, 1996. Cole, who has published other books on chemical and biological weapons, examines various programs in the United States and Iraq, while emphasizing that morality is important in responding to the challenges posed by these weapons. Miller, Judith, Stephen Engelberg, and William Broad. Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. This book, written by three New York Times reporters, explores the ideas and actions of scientists and politicians involved in the past, present, and future of germ warfare. Forty-two pages of notes and a select bibliography. Piller, Charles, and Keith R. Yamamoto. Gene Wars: Military Control over the New Genetic Technologies. New York: William Morrow, 1988. A journalist teamed with a molecular biologist to write this book in order to demystify new biological technologies for the nonscientist and to alert scientists of their special responsibility to enlighten public debates about BW research. Appendices on recombinant DNA and BW treaties. Selected bibliography. Web Site of Interest Federation of American Scientists, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Program. http://www.fas.org/bwc. An organization dedicated to educationg the public about biological weapons. The site posts position papers, information on bioterrorism, and links to related documents, including the Joint Concept for Non-Lethal Weapons statement from the U.S. Marine Corps' Non-Lethal Weapons Program. |
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