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Criminal Justice Illinois v. McArthur The Case: U.S. Supreme Court ruling defining powers of police officers when obtaining a warrant Date: Decided on February 20, 2001 Criminal Justice Issue: Search and seizure Significance: The decision in Illinois v. McArthur allows police officers with probable cause to believe that criminal evidence is located in a private home to use reasonable means to prevent destruction of that evidence while they are waiting for a search warrant. In Illinois v. McArthur, Tesa McArthur requested and received police protection when she moved out of the trailer where she had been living with her husband, Charles McArthur. After relocating, she informed officer John Love that she had seen her husband hide marijuana under the sofa. When Charles McArthur refused to consent to a search of the trailer, Love instructed his colleague to obtain a search warrant. While waiting for the warrant, Love refused to allow McArthur, who was standing on the front porch, to reenter the trailer, except under supervision. Whenever McArthur went into the trailer, Love stood in the doorway, where he could see the sofa. About two hours later, armed with a warrant, police officers found and seized a small amount of marijuana and a marijuana pipe. When Charles McArthur was prosecuted for misdemeanor possession of an illegal drug and paraphernalia, his attorneys moved to suppress the evidence. They argued that the porch constituted part of the trailer home and that the refusal to allow McArthur free access to his home was inconsistent with a primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment--to secure the privacy of persons in their homes. The trial court granted the motion, and an appellate court upheld the judgment. The state's supreme court denied the petition for a review. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, by an 8-1 vote, held that the restriction on McArthur had been reasonable in light of the circumstances. Writing for the Court, Justice Stephen Breyer balanced privacy considerations with concerns of law enforcement and made six points. First, the police had probable cause to believe that criminal evidence existed in a particular place. Second, there was good reason to expect that McArthur, unless supervised, would destroy the evidence. Third, the officers did not violate McArthur's personal privacy beyond the extent necessary to secure the evidence. Fourth, the restraint did not continue any longer than necessary. Fifth, earlier precedents had recognized that a person standing in a an open doorway was in a "public place." Sixth, in contrast to Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984), the offenses at issue in this case were jailable crimes. In a concurring opinion, Justice David Souter wrote that if Charles McArthur had not stepped outside the trailer, the threat of his destroying evidence would have constituted exigent circumstances to justify a prompt, warrantless search of the trailer. In a dissenting opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the majority struck the wrong balance, and he praised the Illinois jurists for placing a higher value on the sanctity of a private home than on the prosecution of a petty offense. The McArthur decision did not break any new ground, but it helped clarify the extent to which police officers, when acting reasonably and with sensitivity, might intrude into the privacy of a home in order to prevent the destruction of criminal evidence. Thomas Tandy Lewis Further ReadingEpstein, Lee, and Thomas Walker. Constitutional Law for a Changing America. 5th ed. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 2003. O'Brien, David M. Constitutional Law and Politics. 6th ed. New York: W. W. Norton, 2005. See Also Fourth Amendment; Privacy rights; Probable cause; Search and seizure; Search warrants; Supreme Court, U.S. |
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